هستی و زمان هایدگر (جلسه پنجم)؛ وظیفه ساختگشایی تاریخ هستیشناسی (بندهای ۲۰ تا ۲۶)
Summary
The video explores Heidegger's concept of 'deconstructive investigation' (Destruktion) applied to the history of ontology, arguing that understanding Being requires uncovering the historical layers of its interpretation. It critiques the Greek and modern metaphysical traditions for neglecting the fundamental question of Being and becoming entangled in traditional interpretations, particularly concerning time and subjectivity. The text emphasizes the need to return to original experiences and expose the historical roots of concepts to revitalize philosophical inquiry and avoid a museum-like engagement with the past.
Key Insights
Dasein's historicity precedes historical events and is the basis for understanding world history.
Historicity, as the temporal calendar of Dasein's events and its being-in-the-world, is a primary determination that precedes any world history. Before world history is possible, Dasein must be historical. Dasein is always what it has been, whether revealed or concealed. Its past is not merely a trait it carries but its very mode of being, unfolding authentically in relation to its future. Dasein develops and understands itself within a traditional interpretation of its past, which opens up its possibilities. This past, as the past of its generation, moves ahead of Dasein, guiding its way. Dasein can uncover and research tradition, making historical investigation a potential task. This is only possible because Dasein is fundamentally determined by historicity. The absence of historical inquiry is not a refutation of historicity but a sign of its deficient mode, as only a historical being can be ahistorical.
Tradition conceals the fundamental historicity of Dasein, leading to a false sense of knowledge.
Dasein grows within a traditional interpretation of itself and initially understands itself based on this tradition. This understanding opens up possibilities for its existence. The past of Dasein, as the past of its generation, always moves ahead of it. While this historicity can remain hidden, it can also be discovered and cared for. Dasein can uncover and research tradition, undertaking the task of understanding what and how it is transmitted. However, tradition, while providing a lens for understanding the world, can also conceal Dasein's fundamental historicity, leading to a 'illusion of knowing.' Concepts become hollowed out, losing their original, vital meaning. This is where Heidegger's concept of 'deconstruction' (Destruktion) becomes crucial. Deconstruction, however, is not about destroying the past but about dismantling it to understand its origins, much like disassembling an old engine to see how it worked initially. This process allows for a return to the original experiences that gave rise to these concepts. If this historical root remains hidden, historical inquiry becomes impossible. A lack of historiography is proof of a deficiency in Dasein's temporal existence.
Tradition obstructs access to original sources of concepts and the necessity of returning to them.
When Dasein decides to seize its inherent potential and clarify its existence, it questions the meaning of Being. If this inquiry recognizes Dasein's inherent historicity, it understands that the very question of Being has a historical character. Thus, the process of questioning Being must draw guidance from its own historicity to achieve an authentic appropriation of the past. The question of Being, due to its temporal and historical grounding, is inherently historical. When examining Dasein's fundamental structures in its average, everyday mode, it's clear that Dasein tends to become absorbed in its world and interpret itself through its reflections. Simultaneously, it falls into tradition, which relieves Dasein of leadership in inquiry and choice. This is particularly true for ontological understanding rooted in Dasein's most authentic mode of being. The tradition obscures what it transmits, making it seem self-evident and blocking access to the original sources of concepts. It can even lead to forgetting the necessity of returning to these sources and the importance of such a return.
Superficial engagement with diverse philosophies masks a deeper rootlessness and inability to engage with the past authentically.
Tradition, by obscuring original concepts and blocking access to their sources, can lead Dasein to forget the necessity of returning to them. This erosion of historicity causes Dasein to focus on superficial variations in philosophical views from different cultures, attempting to hide its own rootlessness. Consequently, despite an apparent historical interest and a desire for literal interpretations, Dasein becomes incapable of understanding the basic conditions for a positive return to the past, essentially losing the ability to possess it constructively. This 'museum-like' engagement with history, as described by Heidegger, prevents a genuine connection with the past's formative power.
The question of Being, despite metaphysical interest, has been largely forgotten due to Greek ontology's focus on the world.
The question of the meaning of Being has not only been unresolved and inadequately posed but, despite interest in metaphysics, has been largely forgotten. Greek ontology and its history continue to determine the conceptual framework of philosophy, demonstrating Dasein's tendency to understand itself and Being in terms of the world. This world-oriented ontology has fallen into a tradition where Being is reduced to self-evidence or mere material for further philosophical work, as seen in Hegel. Greek ontology, detached from its roots, became an inflexible set of doctrines in the Middle Ages. Even so, its systematic structure did not merely assemble borrowed elements; significant work was done within its dogmatic boundaries. Through medieval disputations, Greek ontology laid the groundwork for modern metaphysics and even determined the foundations and aims of Hegel's logic. While distinct spheres of Being were considered, the question of their Being and their ontological structure remained unasked due to the overarching neglect of the question of Being itself.
Greek ontology, especially in its modern interpretation, has reduced Being to mere objects or concepts, neglecting its ontological structure.
The tradition of ontology, particularly its medieval form, has been rigidified. The mediating concepts of ontology, in their various forms, have been applied only restrictively or negatively, or dialectics has been used to interpret the Being of the subject. If the question of Being is to gain clarity about its own history, this rigid tradition must be softened, and the veils it has created must be removed. This task involves deconstructing the content of ancient ontology, guided by the question of Being, to reach the original experiences that first determined Being. This process of uncovering the origins of fundamental ontological concepts is not relativistic but serves to reveal their positive possibilities and define their boundaries. The negative function of deconstruction targets the present mode of engaging with the history of ontology—whether as history of opinion, spirit, or problems—rather than the past itself. Its aim is positive: to unveil, not bury, the past.
Deconstructing ontology's history requires examining the relationship between Being and time, especially Kant's concept of schematism.
Deconstructing the history of ontology is intrinsically linked to how the question of Being is posed. Our aim is to process this question fundamentally, and thus we can only deconstruct decisive moments in its history. The preliminary question is whether, and to what extent, the interpretation of Being in ontological history has been subjectively linked to the phenomenon of time, and whether the problematic of temporality necessary for this interpretation has been fundamentally processed. Kant is identified as the first and only one to take steps, albeit compelled by the phenomena themselves, towards researching the temporality dimension. Understanding Kant's doctrine of schematism is key to illuminating the enigmatic aspects of his philosophy on time, but also to showing why this realm ultimately remained closed to him in its true dimensions and ontological function. Kant was aware of the dark and perilous territory he was entering, describing schematism as a hidden art of the human soul.
Kant's philosophy, while recognizing time's role, remained bound by tradition, preventing a full grasp of Being's temporality.
Kant believed the mind actively shapes the world, not just reflects it. He proposed two main faculties: sensibility (space and time as a priori forms for ordering sensory data) and understanding (12 categories like causality for conceptualizing sensory input). The challenge for Kant was bridging the gap between timeless categories and temporal phenomena, which he addressed through 'schematism' – a mediating function of imagination. Schemata, like successive time (number) or the fullness/emptiness of time, translate timeless concepts into temporal forms for sensibility. However, Kant, recognizing schematism as a hidden art, hesitated to fully explore its implications, fearing it would undermine the traditional metaphysical structure. He saw the critique of pure reason as his task, but the radical implications of time's fundamental role for Being remained unexplored, leading to his 'retreat' from this dark territory.
Kant's adherence to Descartes' subjectivism and a traditional view of time prevented him from grasping the Being-time correlation.
Two factors hindered Kant's insight into temporality: first, the neglect of the question of Being in general and the lack of an ontology of Dasein (or a prior ontological analysis of subjectivity). Kant, despite his steps beyond Descartes, adopted Cartesian subjectivism. Second, his analysis of time, while returning it to the subject, retained a traditional, common-sense understanding of time as a sequence of moments. This prevented him from processing the phenomenon of transcendental determination of time in its specific structure and function. Consequently, the decisive correlation between time and 'I think' remained concealed. Kant's ontological commitment to Descartes led him to neglect Dasein's ontology, a crucial oversight given Descartes' 'Cogito, ergo sum' ('I think, therefore I am'), which, while establishing a foundation, left the meaning of 'am' (Being) itself undifferentiated from the Being of objects.
Descartes' 'Cogito' established a foundation but neglected the meaning of 'Being' itself, treating it like objective existence.
Descartes, aiming for a new, unshakable foundation with 'Cogito, ergo sum,' failed to differentiate the Being of the thinking subject from the Being of objects. He equated 'I am' with the Being of a stone or chair, a fundamental oversight ('fateful prejudice') inherited from medieval ontology's concept of 'creature.' This influenced subsequent philosophy, leading to an ontological analysis of the mind as a subject without critically questioning its Being. Descartes’ reliance on medieval terminology, such as 'thinking substance' or 'ens cogitans,' linked him to scholastic ontology. The full impact of this medieval ontology on subsequent eras, particularly its determination (or lack thereof) of the ontological character of the thinking subject, can only be assessed after deconstructing the ancient ontological understanding of Being in light of the problematic of time.
Ancient Greek ontology understood Being as 'presence' (ousia), implicitly rooted in the present moment of time.
The Greek interpretation of Being as 'presence' (ousia), often translated as 'substance,' was implicitly guided by time without explicit knowledge of this. They used time as a measuring stick, defining Being as presence in the present, but failed to recognize time's fundamental ontological role. Instead, they treated time itself as another entity, attempting to understand its structure within a naive understanding of Being already dependent on time. This created a paradox: understanding Being through time, yet failing to grasp time itself. The external proof of this is the meaning of Being as 'presence' (parousia), understood in relation to the 'now.' The problematic of Greek ontology should take its cue from Dasein itself. The Greek definition of humans as 'zoon logon echon' (living being determined by discourse) highlights the fundamental role of language in bringing beings to presence. Thus, Plato's ontology became dialectic, aiming to grasp beings through discourse, and Aristotle further refined this by seeing discourse/thought as the simple perception of an objective presence.
Ancient Greek ontology, by defining Being as 'presence,' effectively limited it to the 'now' and neglected Dasein's authentic temporality.
The Greek understanding of Being as presence (ousia) implicitly relied on the present moment, failing to explicitly acknowledge time's guiding role. They treated time as another entity, attempting to understand its structure within an underdeveloped conception of Being already dependent on time. This led to a circularity where Being was understood through time, but time itself remained obscure. Their definition of Being as 'presence' (parousia) meant that beings were understood in relation to the 'now.' This limited the understanding of Being to the present, neglecting the dynamic, existential temporality of Dasein tied to past and future. This metaphysical conception of Being as presence has dominated Western philosophy for millennia. The definition of humans as 'zoon logon echon' (living being determined by discourse) reflects this focus, as discourse brings beings to presence. This led to Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's view of thought as the perception of present beings, resulting in an ontology that understood Being primarily as presence.
Aristotle's definition of time as the 'number of motion' objectified and spatialized time, influencing subsequent metaphysics.
The Greek interpretation of Being as presence, implicitly guided by time, was not explicitly recognized. Plato's ontology developed into dialectic, and Aristotle further refined it, viewing discourse/thought as the simple perception of a present objective being. This resulted in an ontology that understood Being primarily as presence, effectively limiting it to the 'now' and neglecting Dasein's authentic temporality. Aristotle's treatise on time, the first detailed interpretation of the phenomenon, defined time as the 'number of motion according to before and after.' This definition mechanizes and objectifies time, reducing it to a series of 'nows' – points on a line separating past from future. This is the common, clock-time understanding of time, where time becomes a container for us. This understanding of time, rooted in presence and objectification, became a cornerstone of Western metaphysics, influencing Kant and beyond, and ensuring that the Greek ontological orientation remained fundamentally the same, despite new modes of questioning.
Sections
The Task of Deconstructing the History of Ontology
Research and inquiry into Being are existential possibilities for Dasein, rooted in its temporality.
Every inquiry, including one centered on the question of Being, is an ontological possibility of Dasein. Dasein finds its meaning in temporality, which is also the condition for its historicity. Historicity, as a mode of Dasein's temporal being, is primary to historical events. Dasein's existence is always its past, not as a driving force, but as its very mode of being, unfolding in relation to its future. Dasein grows within a traditional interpretation of itself, which shapes its understanding and possibilities. The past, as the past of one's generation, moves ahead of Dasein, guiding it. Dasein can uncover, preserve, and research tradition, making the historical investigation of its own being a task. Historical inquiry is only possible because Dasein is fundamentally determined by historicity. A lack of historical inquiry does not disprove historicity but is a deficient mode of it, as one can only be ahistorical precisely because one is historical.
Dasein's historicity precedes historical events and is the basis for understanding world history.
Historicity, as the temporal calendar of Dasein's events and its being-in-the-world, is a primary determination that precedes any world history. Before world history is possible, Dasein must be historical. Dasein is always what it has been, whether revealed or concealed. Its past is not merely a trait it carries but its very mode of being, unfolding authentically in relation to its future. Dasein develops and understands itself within a traditional interpretation of its past, which opens up its possibilities. This past, as the past of its generation, moves ahead of Dasein, guiding its way. Dasein can uncover and research tradition, making historical investigation a potential task. This is only possible because Dasein is fundamentally determined by historicity. The absence of historical inquiry is not a refutation of historicity but a sign of its deficient mode, as only a historical being can be ahistorical.
Tradition conceals the fundamental historicity of Dasein, leading to a false sense of knowledge.
Dasein grows within a traditional interpretation of itself and initially understands itself based on this tradition. This understanding opens up possibilities for its existence. The past of Dasein, as the past of its generation, always moves ahead of it. While this historicity can remain hidden, it can also be discovered and cared for. Dasein can uncover and research tradition, undertaking the task of understanding what and how it is transmitted. However, tradition, while providing a lens for understanding the world, can also conceal Dasein's fundamental historicity, leading to a 'illusion of knowing.' Concepts become hollowed out, losing their original, vital meaning. This is where Heidegger's concept of 'deconstruction' (Destruktion) becomes crucial. Deconstruction, however, is not about destroying the past but about dismantling it to understand its origins, much like disassembling an old engine to see how it worked initially. This process allows for a return to the original experiences that gave rise to these concepts. If this historical root remains hidden, historical inquiry becomes impossible. A lack of historiography is proof of a deficiency in Dasein's temporal existence.
Deconstruction involves dismantling tradition to uncover original experiences and concepts.
When Dasein grasps its potential and clarifies the meaning of its existence, it questions the meaning of Being itself. If this inquiry opens its eyes to its inherent historicity, it recognizes that the question of Being is also historical. Therefore, the processing of the question of Being must be guided by its own historicity, leading to a positive appropriation of the past and its authentic possibilities. Dasein understands the question of Being as historical, rooted in its temporality and historicity. In its everyday mode, Dasein tends to fall into the world and interpret itself through it, succumbing to tradition. This tradition relieves Dasein of the burden of leading its own inquiry and choice, obscuring what it transmits and blocking access to the original sources of concepts. Tradition can even make us forget the necessity of returning to these sources. It erodes Dasein's historicity, leading to a superficial interest in diverse philosophical views from other cultures to hide its own rootlessness. Ultimately, Dasein loses the ability to understand the conditions for a positive return to the past.
Tradition obstructs access to original sources of concepts and the necessity of returning to them.
When Dasein decides to seize its inherent potential and clarify its existence, it questions the meaning of Being. If this inquiry recognizes Dasein's inherent historicity, it understands that the very question of Being has a historical character. Thus, the process of questioning Being must draw guidance from its own historicity to achieve an authentic appropriation of the past. The question of Being, due to its temporal and historical grounding, is inherently historical. When examining Dasein's fundamental structures in its average, everyday mode, it's clear that Dasein tends to become absorbed in its world and interpret itself through its reflections. Simultaneously, it falls into tradition, which relieves Dasein of leadership in inquiry and choice. This is particularly true for ontological understanding rooted in Dasein's most authentic mode of being. The tradition obscures what it transmits, making it seem self-evident and blocking access to the original sources of concepts. It can even lead to forgetting the necessity of returning to these sources and the importance of such a return.
Superficial engagement with diverse philosophies masks a deeper rootlessness and inability to engage with the past authentically.
Tradition, by obscuring original concepts and blocking access to their sources, can lead Dasein to forget the necessity of returning to them. This erosion of historicity causes Dasein to focus on superficial variations in philosophical views from different cultures, attempting to hide its own rootlessness. Consequently, despite an apparent historical interest and a desire for literal interpretations, Dasein becomes incapable of understanding the basic conditions for a positive return to the past, essentially losing the ability to possess it constructively. This 'museum-like' engagement with history, as described by Heidegger, prevents a genuine connection with the past's formative power.
The Ontological Tradition and the Forgotten Question of Being
The question of Being, despite metaphysical interest, has been largely forgotten due to Greek ontology's focus on the world.
The question of the meaning of Being has not only been unresolved and inadequately posed but, despite interest in metaphysics, has been largely forgotten. Greek ontology and its history continue to determine the conceptual framework of philosophy, demonstrating Dasein's tendency to understand itself and Being in terms of the world. This world-oriented ontology has fallen into a tradition where Being is reduced to self-evidence or mere material for further philosophical work, as seen in Hegel. Greek ontology, detached from its roots, became an inflexible set of doctrines in the Middle Ages. Even so, its systematic structure did not merely assemble borrowed elements; significant work was done within its dogmatic boundaries. Through medieval disputations, Greek ontology laid the groundwork for modern metaphysics and even determined the foundations and aims of Hegel's logic. While distinct spheres of Being were considered, the question of their Being and their ontological structure remained unasked due to the overarching neglect of the question of Being itself.
Greek ontology, especially in its modern interpretation, has reduced Being to mere objects or concepts, neglecting its ontological structure.
The tradition of ontology, particularly its medieval form, has been rigidified. The mediating concepts of ontology, in their various forms, have been applied only restrictively or negatively, or dialectics has been used to interpret the Being of the subject. If the question of Being is to gain clarity about its own history, this rigid tradition must be softened, and the veils it has created must be removed. This task involves deconstructing the content of ancient ontology, guided by the question of Being, to reach the original experiences that first determined Being. This process of uncovering the origins of fundamental ontological concepts is not relativistic but serves to reveal their positive possibilities and define their boundaries. The negative function of deconstruction targets the present mode of engaging with the history of ontology—whether as history of opinion, spirit, or problems—rather than the past itself. Its aim is positive: to unveil, not bury, the past.
Deconstruction aims to soften rigid traditions and reveal the positive possibilities of ontology by returning to original experiences.
Deconstructing the history of ontology is essential for understanding the question of Being. This process involves softening the rigidified tradition and removing the veils it has created. The goal is to deconstruct the content of ancient ontology, guided by the question of Being, to reach the original experiences that first determined Being. This is not about relativizing ontological views but about revealing their positive possibilities and respecting their boundaries. The negative aspect of deconstruction is not directed at the past but critiques the present way of engaging with ontological history. The positive aim is to unveil the past, not bury it. In the Iranian context, deconstruction would involve dismantling both the native Islamic-mystical tradition and imported modern concepts, returning to the original existential anguish of figures like Mulla Sadra or questioning the uncritical adoption of Western notions like subjectivity and democracy. This requires the courage to think beyond ready-made answers from tradition.
Deconstructing Kant's Doctrine of Schematism and Time
Deconstructing ontology's history requires examining the relationship between Being and time, especially Kant's concept of schematism.
Deconstructing the history of ontology is intrinsically linked to how the question of Being is posed. Our aim is to process this question fundamentally, and thus we can only deconstruct decisive moments in its history. The preliminary question is whether, and to what extent, the interpretation of Being in ontological history has been subjectively linked to the phenomenon of time, and whether the problematic of temporality necessary for this interpretation has been fundamentally processed. Kant is identified as the first and only one to take steps, albeit compelled by the phenomena themselves, towards researching the temporality dimension. Understanding Kant's doctrine of schematism is key to illuminating the enigmatic aspects of his philosophy on time, but also to showing why this realm ultimately remained closed to him in its true dimensions and ontological function. Kant was aware of the dark and perilous territory he was entering, describing schematism as a hidden art of the human soul.
Kant's philosophy, while recognizing time's role, remained bound by tradition, preventing a full grasp of Being's temporality.
Kant believed the mind actively shapes the world, not just reflects it. He proposed two main faculties: sensibility (space and time as a priori forms for ordering sensory data) and understanding (12 categories like causality for conceptualizing sensory input). The challenge for Kant was bridging the gap between timeless categories and temporal phenomena, which he addressed through 'schematism' – a mediating function of imagination. Schemata, like successive time (number) or the fullness/emptiness of time, translate timeless concepts into temporal forms for sensibility. However, Kant, recognizing schematism as a hidden art, hesitated to fully explore its implications, fearing it would undermine the traditional metaphysical structure. He saw the critique of pure reason as his task, but the radical implications of time's fundamental role for Being remained unexplored, leading to his 'retreat' from this dark territory.
Kant's adherence to Descartes' subjectivism and a traditional view of time prevented him from grasping the Being-time correlation.
Two factors hindered Kant's insight into temporality: first, the neglect of the question of Being in general and the lack of an ontology of Dasein (or a prior ontological analysis of subjectivity). Kant, despite his steps beyond Descartes, adopted Cartesian subjectivism. Second, his analysis of time, while returning it to the subject, retained a traditional, common-sense understanding of time as a sequence of moments. This prevented him from processing the phenomenon of transcendental determination of time in its specific structure and function. Consequently, the decisive correlation between time and 'I think' remained concealed. Kant's ontological commitment to Descartes led him to neglect Dasein's ontology, a crucial oversight given Descartes' 'Cogito, ergo sum' ('I think, therefore I am'), which, while establishing a foundation, left the meaning of 'am' (Being) itself undifferentiated from the Being of objects.
Descartes' 'Cogito' established a foundation but neglected the meaning of 'Being' itself, treating it like objective existence.
Descartes, aiming for a new, unshakable foundation with 'Cogito, ergo sum,' failed to differentiate the Being of the thinking subject from the Being of objects. He equated 'I am' with the Being of a stone or chair, a fundamental oversight ('fateful prejudice') inherited from medieval ontology's concept of 'creature.' This influenced subsequent philosophy, leading to an ontological analysis of the mind as a subject without critically questioning its Being. Descartes’ reliance on medieval terminology, such as 'thinking substance' or 'ens cogitans,' linked him to scholastic ontology. The full impact of this medieval ontology on subsequent eras, particularly its determination (or lack thereof) of the ontological character of the thinking subject, can only be assessed after deconstructing the ancient ontological understanding of Being in light of the problematic of time.
Deconstructing Ancient Greek Ontology: Time and Being
Ancient Greek ontology understood Being as 'presence' (ousia), implicitly rooted in the present moment of time.
The Greek interpretation of Being as 'presence' (ousia), often translated as 'substance,' was implicitly guided by time without explicit knowledge of this. They used time as a measuring stick, defining Being as presence in the present, but failed to recognize time's fundamental ontological role. Instead, they treated time itself as another entity, attempting to understand its structure within a naive understanding of Being already dependent on time. This created a paradox: understanding Being through time, yet failing to grasp time itself. The external proof of this is the meaning of Being as 'presence' (parousia), understood in relation to the 'now.' The problematic of Greek ontology should take its cue from Dasein itself. The Greek definition of humans as 'zoon logon echon' (living being determined by discourse) highlights the fundamental role of language in bringing beings to presence. Thus, Plato's ontology became dialectic, aiming to grasp beings through discourse, and Aristotle further refined this by seeing discourse/thought as the simple perception of an objective presence.
Ancient Greek ontology, by defining Being as 'presence,' effectively limited it to the 'now' and neglected Dasein's authentic temporality.
The Greek understanding of Being as presence (ousia) implicitly relied on the present moment, failing to explicitly acknowledge time's guiding role. They treated time as another entity, attempting to understand its structure within an underdeveloped conception of Being already dependent on time. This led to a circularity where Being was understood through time, but time itself remained obscure. Their definition of Being as 'presence' (parousia) meant that beings were understood in relation to the 'now.' This limited the understanding of Being to the present, neglecting the dynamic, existential temporality of Dasein tied to past and future. This metaphysical conception of Being as presence has dominated Western philosophy for millennia. The definition of humans as 'zoon logon echon' (living being determined by discourse) reflects this focus, as discourse brings beings to presence. This led to Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's view of thought as the perception of present beings, resulting in an ontology that understood Being primarily as presence.
Aristotle's definition of time as the 'number of motion' objectified and spatialized time, influencing subsequent metaphysics.
The Greek interpretation of Being as presence, implicitly guided by time, was not explicitly recognized. Plato's ontology developed into dialectic, and Aristotle further refined it, viewing discourse/thought as the simple perception of a present objective being. This resulted in an ontology that understood Being primarily as presence, effectively limiting it to the 'now' and neglecting Dasein's authentic temporality. Aristotle's treatise on time, the first detailed interpretation of the phenomenon, defined time as the 'number of motion according to before and after.' This definition mechanizes and objectifies time, reducing it to a series of 'nows' – points on a line separating past from future. This is the common, clock-time understanding of time, where time becomes a container for us. This understanding of time, rooted in presence and objectification, became a cornerstone of Western metaphysics, influencing Kant and beyond, and ensuring that the Greek ontological orientation remained fundamentally the same, despite new modes of questioning.
Bergson's distinction between mathematical time (spatialized) and duration (lived, fluid time) critiques the Aristotelian-influenced view.
Aristotle's definition of time as the 'number of motion' rendered time mechanical and objective, focusing on the 'now' as a boundary and treating time as a series of present moments. This common understanding of time influenced subsequent philosophical and scientific thought. Henri Bergson, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, critiqued this view, distinguishing between 'mathematical time' (spatialized, measurable, like Aristotelian time) and 'duration' (the real, lived, fluid, and indivisible experience of time). Bergson argued that mathematical time is not true time but a spatial concept, while duration is the continuous flow of consciousness where past, present, and future interpenetrate. He believed that by confusing time with space, Western thought had fundamentally misunderstood time. Bergson's concept of duration, where the past continuously flows into the present and shapes the future, offers a contrast to the static, 'now'-centric view.
Deconstructing the ontological tradition is necessary to make the question of Being truly concrete and accessible.
By analyzing Aristotle's concept of time and recognizing that Kant's interpretation moved within Aristotelian structures, it becomes clear that Kant's fundamental ontological orientation remained Greek. He could not escape the Aristotelian view of time as a series of objective, present moments. Therefore, the question of Being can only become truly concrete and accessible by pursuing the deconstruction of the ontological tradition to its core. This process reveals the inevitability and necessity of the question of the meaning of Being and clarifies what it means to resume this question. Any research in this area, where the subject matter is deeply hidden, must avoid overemphasizing its results, as such inquiry always opens up horizons for more fundamental and universal answers. Only when the question of Being is awakened can these possibilities be seriously explored.
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